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The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and
Environment: NAFTA, Competitiveness, and the
Pursuit of Environmental Welfare Objectives
ILEANA M. PORRAS"
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is often
claimed to be a "promisingbeginning" for the reconciliationof trade
and environment. ProfessorPorras,however, suggests that the form
that "reconciliation" takes in NAFTA is extremely problematic.
Harmonization of standards to facilitate the free flow of trade is a
familiar trade goal. NAFTA's provisions regarding environmental
standards, however, are not a straightforward requirement to
harmonize standards. Rather, NAFTA recognizes state autonomy in
standardsetting, on the one hand, while requiring a form of upward
harmonization, on the other. According to Professor Porras, the
result of such an arrangement is the perpetuation of economic and
political inequality among states. States with low environmental
standards are not given the opportunity to set their environmental
standards in accordance with their own values, capacities, and
priorities,but must instead divert resources to achieve the standards
that are deemed appropriate by states with higher environmental
standards. Professor Porras argues that the dual choice of
"autonomy" and "upward harmonization" in NAFTA reflects the
desire of environmentalists in high-standardstates to safeguard both
their environmental standards and their standards of living. States
with lower standardsare made to raise their standards so that their
comparatively lower standards do not enable them to gain a
competitive advantage to the detriment of the high standard states'
economies. Professor Porras suggests that in choosing "upward
harmonization," environmentalists in high-standard states are
responding to the perceived link between environmentalprotection
and the nation's economic health. In selecting a mechanism which
tends to perpetuate existing economic inequalities between states,
however, NAFTA fails to give equal attention to the demands of
"sustainabledevelopment" in poorercountries.

Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law. This piece should be read as a small part
of an ongoing project which examines various facets of the evolving relationship between the fields of
international trade and environmental protection. I am very grateful to the Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies for the opportunity to air my thoughts during the symposium on "International Environmental Laws
and Agencies: The Next Generation" and would like to thank all participants for a very useful exchange of
ideas.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Until quite recently, the activities of environmental protection' and
international trade2 were imagined to be taking place in quite distinct spaces.
While the disciplines and practice of both "trade" and the "environment" were
undergoing rapid expansion and transformation, they were never understood
to share either history, philosophy, practices or institutions. Meetings on trade
matters were as unlikely to address environmental concerns as environmental
gatherings were likely to discuss trade policy. Yet, in the last few years, these
once autonomous fields have experienced, what we might term without
exaggeration, a relational revolution. Starting from an initial stance of mutual
disregard, the disciplines of environmental protection and international trade
passed through three phases; first through a stage of mutual awareness, in
which they recognized the unwelcome if inescapable relationship between
their two enterprises, to a phase of reciprocal hostility with strident claims of
irreconcilable differences, until finally, through the exertions of well-meaning
conciliators, they arrived at the present point of accommodation.3
Today, the prevailing view is that trade and the environment are not
necessarily at loggerheads. To the contrary, much of the recent scholarship
claims that the relationship between trade and environment is entering a new

1. The concept "environmental protection" encompasses a bewildering array of often contested
environmental welfare objectives and the piecemeal governmental regulation of domestic economic and
noneconomic human activities that are thought to contribute to a given environmental problem.
"Environmental protection" refers to inter alia: the protection, conservation and restoration of natural
habitats and species; the protection of human health and safety through the provision of safe water and clean
air; the reduction or elimination of toxic and other hazardous substances from the human environment
(including the workplace); the safe handling and disposal of harmful substances; the rational exploitation,
use, and management of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources including ores, minerals and oil, but
also fish, wildlife, water and trees; and the protection or preservation of unique landscapes and habitats,
through their designation as national parks or other protected status.
2. International trade-the exchange of goods across national borders-has generally been considered
to be a vital economic activity, engaged in by a group of specialized traders (usually but not always private
economic actors). Traditionally, the purpose of trade has been twofold: First, to make a wider array
of goods available to consumers; and, second, to produce wealth for the traders and their respective nations.
3. While neither practice nor scholarship fits perfectly into such a linear account, the tale of the
relational progression of trade and environment is intended to capture the lived experience of most
practitioners and academics in these fields. It seeks to convey the sense of surprise still felt, by those in the
worlds of trade and environment, at the sudden omnipresence of the coupling of "trade and environment."
This coupling is made even more surprising when we recognize the extent to which it has overshadowed the
linkage of environment and development; a linkage which was consecrated by the promulgation of the
concept of "sustainable development" at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development.
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and promising era, an era of compatibility and mutual reinforcement.' It is
also an era for which the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)l
is often read as a precursor or model-a "good beginning."
NAFTA-a notable accomplishment from a trade perspective promoting
as it does regional free trade in both goods and services-has also been hailed
as the most environmentally sensitive trade agreement. While cynics might
point out that the competition was not hard to beat, it is important to examine
how NAFTA achieves this distinction. How is the reconciliation between
trade and environment achieved in NAFTA? The framing of this question
suggests at least two related lines of inquiry: First, given that NAFTA is
unabashedly a trade agreement, how does NAFTA in fact "take the
environment into account?" Second, to the extent that NAFTA responds to or
reflects the concerns and choices of the "environment," what conclusions can
we begin to draw about the transformative effect on the practices, institutions,
and objectives of the environment, of its willing association with trade?
In this paper, I suggest that NAFTA is a dangerous model. I argue that the
driving objective of environmentalists in high-standard states as they
undertook to associate with "trade" in NAFTA, was first and foremost to
safeguard their own high environmental standards (and their continued ability
to raise them). In order to achieve this end, they sought NAFTA's recognition
of sovereign prerogative in standard setting. Responding to a national trade
claim that comparatively high standards could lead to a loss of competitiveness
4. For a representative sampling see JAGDISH BHAGWATI, Trade and the Environment: The False
Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, POLICY AND ECONOMICS 159-90, (Durwood Zaelke et.
al. eds., 1993); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 Cornell
Int'l L.J. 459 (1994); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling InternationalTrade with Preservationthe Protection
of the Global Commons: Can We Prosperand Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407 (1992); Richard
Eglin, Enlisting the Support of Liberal Tradefor Environmental Protectionand Sustainable Development,
23 ENVTL. L. 697 (1993); DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FuTURE,
(1994); Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually
Reinforcing: ForgingCompetitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545 (1993); John H. Jackson, World Trade
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992); Peter
L. Lallas et. al., Environmental Protectionand InternationalTrade: Toward MutuallySupportive Rules and
Policies, 16 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 271 (1992); J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A New Model for InternationalCollaborationon Trade and
the Environment,5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL. 273 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade,
Competition,Environmental Protection,27 INT'L L. 751 (1993).
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-U.S.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. In the environmental context, NAFTA also refers
to the related North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, done Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-U.S.Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]; Agreement Concerning The Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 16-18, 1993, Mex.U.S., 32 LL.M. 1545 [hereinafter Border Agreement].
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and a consequent lowering of standards, environmentalists in high-standard
states sought to preserve their nation's economic position by reducing any
compartive advantage that might be gained from lower standards. This was
achieved by adopting a structure that seeks standard "compatibility,"
enhancement of protection levels, and non-derogation of existing standards,
which I take to be functionally equivalent to the goal of "upward"
harmonization.
I seek to demonstrate that while harmonization of standards is a familiar
trade goal, the goal of "upward" harmonization is distinctively the result of the
intervention of high-standard environmentalists in the trade treaty-making
process. It is the result, in other words, of the much-heralded "reconciliation"
of trade and the environment. I then argue that "upward" harmonization is a
mechanism which is likely to perpetuate economic and political inequalities
between states. Low-standard states are not "free" to choose their preferred
standards in accordance with their values and priorities and are kept in a
perpetual state of having to catch-up to high-standard states (who are free to
choose ever higher standards). I then suggest that adopting an environmental
mechanism which perpetuates inequality does not seem consonant with
environmental values or the recognition of the link between environment and
development. In their association with trade, I conclude, environmentalists
become cognizant of economic issues to the extent*that they affect their own
environmental interests. In their engagement with trade, we might then claim
that environmentalists become partisans of their own state's economic
interests, so long as they can keep their own standards intact.
II. NAFTA "TAKES THE ENVIRONMENT INTO ACCOUNT"
The preambular pieties declare that the anticipated development and
expansion of world trade is to be undertaken "in a manner consistent with
environment protection and conservation," specifying the -goals of
"promot[ing] sustainable development [and] strengthen[ing] the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations." 6 Beyond these, the
main thrust of the environmental provisions in NAFTA is standards oriented.
NAFTA endorses the sovereign right of each Party to establish its preferred
environmental standards, subject to certain limitations intended to prevent the

6. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 297.
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It recognizes that

while such standards may sometimes conflict with other NAFTA obligations,
each Party should be free to maintain them so long as they are applied in a
non-arbitrary manner.' While NAFTA embraces state autonomy in standard
setting, it nevertheless discourages Parties from lowering standards in order to
attract foreign investment.' Plus, it exhorts them to work jointly to enhance
levels of environmental protection and to make their standards-related

measures compatible so as to facilitate trade. 0
While the related environmental side agreement creating the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)" has elicited
a great deal of favorable commentary, it could also be characterized as being
primarily concerned with safeguarding the sovereign rights of each Party to
establish its preferred environmental standards while working toward
compatibility of standards. The procedures established under NAAEC,
7. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 368-83, 386-93. In both cases NAFTA recognizes the right of each Party
to adopt national environmental standards which reflect legitimate choices concerning appropriate levels
of protection. Such choices, however, are made subject to scientific scrutiny. In the case of agricultural,
sanitary and phytosanitary standards, Parties are further required to take various economic factors into
account and work toward consistency in order to minimize negative trade effects. In the case of standardsrelated measures, Parties are directed to work to enhance levels of protection and to make their standards
compatible.
8. NAFTA like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is organized around the dual principle of non-discrimination and national treatment
between Parties. NAFTA also incorporates GATT Article XX, which creates specific exceptions to trade
obligations, but departs from current GATT practice by expressly interpreting Article XX(b) to "include
environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" and Article XX(g) to
apply "to measures relating to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources."
NAFTA, supra note 5, at 699 (emphasis added). Further, provisions of Chapter Twenty-Institutional
Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures-require that trade disputes between the Parties concerning
environmental measures be considered under NAFTA dispute settlement procedures rather than taken to
GATT panels for resolution. NAFTA Parties thereby undertake to resolve their environment-trade disputes
from within a regime which explicitly acknowledges that there may be legitimate environmental objectives
which require deviation from trade rules. Finally, NAFTA Article 104 sets out guidelines for reconciling
trade obligations under specified environmental and conservation agreements with NAFTA obligations.
While limited in nature, Article 104 responds to the fear of environmentalists, following recent GATT
jurisprudence, that if implemented, trade obligations under international environmental agreements might
be challenged as inconsistent with GATT or the WTO.
9. NAFTA supra note 5, at 639-49. Article 1114(1) allows, but does not require, a Party to take
otherwise consistent measures, "that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory
is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." However, Article 1114(2) recognizes "that
it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, or environmental measures"
and goes on to provide that "a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion
or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor." Id.
10. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 386-93.
11. NAAEC, supra note 5.
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allowing one Party's citizens to complain about the non-enforcement of
environmental laws by another Party, are limited under the terms of the
agreement to cases in which non-enforcement is claimed to have a negative
trade effect. 2 The side agreement, in accordance with the demands of the
environmental sector (and in contrast to the usual practice of the trade sector),
allows for a high degree of public participation, openness, and transparency of
decision making processes. While NAFTA does not provide for a similarly
improved access to the trade policymaking institutions at the national or
regional levels, it could be argued that NAFTA has moved the expectation of
future practice forward in that direction. After NAFTA, at least in the United
States, it is probable that no large-scale trade agreement will be negotiated in
the absence of some involvement by both consumer and environmental groups.
NAFTA's checkered course through the legislative process in the United States
will likely make trade policymakers sensitive to the need to address
environmental concerns.
It is precisely this new availability of the
international trade process to those asserting the interests of environmental
protection which has led to much of the optimism concerning the future
promises of the trade and environment reconciliation. It is also this new
availability which gives urgency to the need for reflection on the impact on
environmental thinking of the sudden and attractive availability of trade
mechanisms to further environmental objectives.
Reconciliation under NAFTA seems to be based on an apparently
contradictory dual gesture. First, an explicit recognition and preservation of
each state's prerogative in setting environmental standards gestures toward the
environment since it enables the state to protect its domestic environment
through self-selected standards, even in the face of a trade based challenge.
This is accompanied, however, by pressure toward overall harmonization of
standards through the subjection of such state choices to scientific scrutiny,

12. Id. NAAEC appears to establish a mechanism to bind Parties to environmental compliance by
threatening sanctions if they persistently fail to enforce their own environmental laws. The possibility of
sanctions for a persistent failure to enforce, however, only becomes available, pursuant to the decision of
an arbitral panel, and such a panel becomes available only under limited circumstances. Id at 1490. Failure
to enforce must relate "to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods
or provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of
the Party complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by persons of another Party."Id.
Thus it seems that in order to be an "interested" party able to bring a claim or join the complaint there must
be an allegation of "an effect on competitiveness" rather than a claim of environmental harm per se. See
also NAAEC, supra note 5, at 1497 (further suggesting that the main concern is effect on competitiveness).
What we have here is the equivalent of a "green" countervailing duty, that is, however, to be managed by
an international body.
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principles of non-arbitrariness, and the pursuit of compatibility--a gesture
toward trade since the purpose of harmonization is to ease and facilitate trade
by eliminating potential trade barriers. 3 While these two gestures might be
thought to be equivalent, the conciliation of trade and the environment in
NAFTA can also be characterized as a promise to respect state choices
concerning environmental protection-so long as those choices conform to the
overall goal of regional harmonization. Not surprisingly, given that we are
examining a trade agreement, the overall goal of promoting trade remains
supreme even within the context of the environmental provisions.
An argument might be made that while NAFTA does impose pressure
toward regional harmonization of environmental standards in order to promote
trade, it at least intervenes in favor of the environment by ensuring that the
pressure is applied in an upward direction rather than allow a more natural
downward harmonization. From this perspective, NAFTA Articles 906(1) and
1104, while placing limits on state autonomy in standard setting, are proenvironment provisions since they are intended to prevent the downgrading of
standards, which is "good" for the environment. 4 Read as an environmental
instrument, NAFTA recognizes that safeguarding state autonomy, in the form
of granting an absolute license for states to choose their own levels of
protection, would not necessarily lead to "good" environmental decisions.
Given an absolute freedom to choose, some states might choose to ignore or
forego environmental protection altogether. Thus, from this perspective,
NAFTA appropriately constrains state choices by imposing limits on the
lowering of standards.
This concession to the environment comes at no cost to trade promotion,
at least within the region. As we have seen, state autonomy in standard-setting
under NAFTA is tempered by the overall goal toward standard harmonization.
Whether harmonization takes place upwards or downwards, the volume of
trade will not be affected, since harmonization at whatever level will eliminate
any potential impediment to trade. Here, then, we might say is an ideal
example of the potential mutual reinforcement of trade and environmental
goals. Absent the obligations undertaken by the Parties under NAFTA, states
13. The term "harmonization" is not used in NAFrA. While harmonization or standardization cannot,

therefore, be claimed as an explicit obligation under NAFTA, I argue that both chapters on standards can
be read as being structured around the long-term objective of harmonization of standards. The lesser
objective of "compatibility" of standards and their subjection to increasingly standardized risk assessment
procedures are, on this reading, viewed as a step in the right "trade" direction-a postponement of the
inevitable.
14. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 387, 639.
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are under no obligation to maintain or raise their level of environmental
protection through the implementation and enforcement of domestic
standards. 5 Absent the incentive of expected economic advantages to be
derived from participation in a trade agreement, states would be unlikely to
assent to such an obligation. That a trade instrument, such as NAFTA, could
be used to impose an apparently environmentally sound obligation on states
otherwise reluctant to bind themselves to environmental commitments and to
achieve this result without consequent detriment to the overall trade objective
of eliminating trade barriers could be seen as auguring a fine future for the
trade and environment relationship. But is it so ideal?
The choice between upward and downward harmonization is not
economically neutral when the starting point of each trading partner is strongly
divergent. Under a regime of upward harmonization, high-standard countries
need only maintain their current standards at no additional cost to their
productive sectors. Low-standard countries, on the other hand, are faced with
the need to undertake significant expenditures if they are to achieve the higher
standards required to attain harmonization. Upward harmonization thus tends
to favor the economic development of high-standard states in two ways: First,
the goal of harmonization provides a counterweight to the possibility that lowstandard states will gain a competitive advantage due to lower environmental
standards. Second, upward harmonization imposes an additional burden on
those state having to work their way up. Furthermore, assuming that state
autonomy in standard setting in high-end countries allows such states to
continuously "improve" environmental protection at home by raising
standards, low-standard countries will be placed in a perpetual state of having
to catch up. From the national economic perspective of high-standard states,
potentially threatening competitors can thereby be neutralized (or at least put
under a disability).
While raising environmental standards under appropriate circumstances
may be a desirable environmental goal, a trade agreement which favors the
economic development of richer states rather than that of poorer states is
unlikely to promote the global objective of sustainable development. 6
15. NAFTA Parties may have specific standard setting obligations arising from their ratification or
accession to other international or regional environmental treaties, but there is as yet no general international
obligation to improve (or even to maintain) a state's chosen level of environmental protection.
16. The assumption is that a strong correlation exists between economic development and levels of
environmental protection. In this paper, I do not wish to address claims made by some analysts that suggest
that there is an automatic relationship between rising GNP levels and attention to the environment on which
we can rely.

See e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF A NORTH
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Recognizing this inequitable economic result does not suggest that downward
harmonization is the preferable option. From an environmental perspective,
downward harmonization is almost certainly the worst possible alternative. It
does, however, reframe the question of the desirability of standard
harmonization itself.
One possible environmental retort, is that "harmonization" of standards
was not an environmental goal in NAFTA, but a trade goal. The choice
presented was not one between harmonization and no harmonization, but a
clear choice between a trade agreement which encouraged downward
harmonization and one which encouraged upward harmonization. As between
the two, the environmental choice was obvious.
While each of. the environment provisions in NAFTA and the
establishment of a Commission for Environmental Cooperation may be
understood as representing progress for the environment vis-a-vis a trade
agreement with no such provisions and no such commission, environmentally
inclined skeptics might yet wonder at the meaning and the ramifications of the
drive toward "reconciliation of trade and environment" in light of NAFTA.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT ASSOCIATES WITH TRADE

The claim that standard "harmonization" was not an environmental goal
but a trade goal seems to oddly ignore the transformational consequences of
the link between environmental and trade concerns. The pursuit of
environmental welfare objectives 7 through the implementation and
enforcement of standards at the national level is certainly familiar. Under ideal
circumstances, domestic standards are set in accordance with national practices
of decision-making. They reflect local values, local approaches to risk, and the
acceptability of trade-offs.
They are based on local assessment of
environmental harms, costs and benefits, and local economic, technological,
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3914,

Oct. 8, 1991). It is clear, however, that the concept of "sustainable development"-the integration of
environment and development-is premised on the recognition that global environmental objectives cannot
be achieved without proper attention to the economic needs of the large proportion of the population living
inpoverty.
17. 1have chosen to use the term "environmental welfare objective" in an attempt to call to mind the

difficulties inherent in pursuing any "welfare objective". There are bound to be disagreements over the
source and degree of moral obligation, over the levels of care that are desirable, over the equitable
distribution of costs and benefits, and over the most efficient means of achieving the agreed upon results.
I have also chosen the term as a means of marking resistance to the current trend of suggesting that we must
pursue environmental protection because it is the economically rational thing to do.
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and institutional capacities. Consequently, differences in standards adopted
by different countries reflect differences in values, approaches to risk, the
acceptability of trade-offs, and so on.
It is precisely because of the direct relationship between local values and
local standards, that citizens of high-standard countries want to preserve their
right to choose their preferred level of environmental protection. When
citizens in high-standard countries seek to shield their standards from external
challenge, they are attempting to limit foreign interference in their
environmental choices. It is because of the experienced relationship between
values, expectations, and standards, that high-standard countrys' citizens reject
the proposal that domestic standards should simply be imported fully-formed
from the outside.' A standard that is not fashioned internally is mistrusted as
the product of a foreign (external) decision making process and therefore
reflective of foreign values. But, there is an environmental price to pay. To
insist on the right of each state to establish its preferred standards and to shield
them from external challenge is to accept that some countries will choose low
standards. Low standards present two challenges to high-standard state
environmentalists: In the first place, environmentalists in high-standard
countries understandably think they have made the "right" choice. From their
perspective most "high" standards are already compromised. Standard setting
at the national level, they realize, already reflects trade-offs between ideal
environmental objectives and the need to achieve consensus. Thus, even high
standards fall short of environmentally "ideal" standards. Lower standards are
therefore likely to be treated as "wrong" or "inappropriate." Thus while
asserting the right of their own country to choose its preferred standards,
foreign standards that are lower than domestic standards are automatically
suspect.
Even outside the context of interstate economic competition, high-standard
state environmentalists will seek ways to encourage other countries to raise
their standards to a level at least as high as the already compromised level
which the environmentalists have been able to achieve at home--simply
18. For example, despite the realization that a high degree of harmonization of national policies is
required for the European Union to achieve its economic objectives, citizens of the member states objected
to the commission's attempt to take over exclusive competence for environmental affairs in order to
establish a single European-wide environmental policy. The concept of subsidiarity, which was adopted as
a counterweight to the Commission's attempt at centralization, provides that decisions concerning the
environment should be made at the lowest practicable level. While there is considerable debate concerning
the meaning and relevance of the principle of subsidiarity, at the very least, it is evidence of a desire to retain
the connection between local values and local standards.
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because it is the environmentally right thing to do. Counterarguments which
insist on returning to the different context of environmental decision-making,
point out the arbitrariness of the priorities, stress that standards may be
different for legitimate reasons, and refer back to the "importance" of state
autonomy in standard setting, are dismissed as so many excuses to abuse and
exploit the environment.
In the context of economic competition, low standards present a second
challenge to high-standard state environmentalists. It is believed that the
existence of low-standard states places additional pressure on the high-end
states' choice of standards. 9 The claim is that low environmental standards
contribute to lower costs of production and therefore give low-standard states
a competitive advantage against high-standard states in most goods, especially
in those goods which involve high levels of regulatory expenditures in highstandard states. The loss of trade competitiveness, it is then argued, will lead
to a further compromise of environmental standards in high-end countries as
they seek to match their competitors' prices. In other words, in the context of
economic competition between low-standard and high-standard states,
standards will inexorably drop further and further below the environmental
"ideal."
In a world not governed by trade agreements, one solution would be to
limit imports (through -tariffs, quotas, or other non-tariff measures such as
production standards) so that the domestic industry would at least benefit from
a "captive" consumer base despite higher prices reflecting higher
environmental standards. Arguably, in the absence of competition from
cheaper imports, domestic prices would better reflect domestic choices
concerning environmental protection. The cost of environmental protection
would be apparent in consumer prices, and consumers would then be free to
signal how much more they were willing to pay for added levels of

19. A number of highly interesting articles have been written concerning environmental regulation
and its effect on competitiveness. See, in particular, Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
InternationalCompetitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) and the response of Alfred C. Aman, Jr. in The
Earth as Egg Shell Victim: A GlobalPerspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993). Both
seem to agree that harmonization or standardization of environmental standards is ultimately desirable from
an environmental perspective. I do not propose in this article to examine the strength or validity of their
arguments and conclusions, which are based on an extrapolation of U.S. experience with federal versus
state-based standards. In fact, my argument relies on their conclusions to a limited extent: Once it is clear
that environmental objectives are tied to the overall goal of continued economic growth, the temptation of
environmentalists in high-end countries will be to embrace upward harmonization because it offers to make
their costly environmental choices palatable at the domestic level with the promise that other states will also
have to bear the burden.
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environmental protection. Such choices would continue to be environmentally
compromised, since environmental values would still have to compete with
other domestic objectives. But at least in a closed system where imports
would be prohibited, environmental values would not have to contend with
external economic pressures.
There are, of course, countless difficulties in even trying to imagine the
dynamics within such a "closed system." In fact, consumer prices would
likely skyrocket as the domestic industry lost its export capacity and the lower
per item production costs provided by the attendant economies of scale.
Further, as industry became less efficient due to the lack of real
competition, product quality would likely decrease. As the national economy
contracted, so too would the commitment to environmental protection. As
traders and economists are quick to point out, neither the local nor the global
environment is likely to benefit from a system of closed economic borders.
As environmentalists in high-standard states recognize, we are neither in
a world of closed economic borders nor in a world of closed environmental
systems. The challenge for high-standard environmentalists working from
within a trade agreement is how to minimize the pressure on standards which
they believe arises from disparate levels while retaining the maximum possible
level of autonomy for their own standards. The most immediately obvious and
appealing solution is to force other states to raise their standards to a level
Thus, upward
closely resembling the high-end states' standards.
harmonization becomes the ideal toward which environmentalists naturally
tend. Upward harmonization is attractive to environmentalists in highstandard states because they are attached to the connection between their
values and their choices, believe their own standards are environmentally right,
and are convinced that as foreign standards come to match their own, the
system will have eliminated any effect that environmental standards might
have on pricing and investment decisions. Eliminating the market "distorting"
effect of disparate environmental standards will in its turn eliminate downward
pressure on high standards."0 Upward harmonization permits the retention of
20. The notion that disparate environmental regulations may distort trade flows requires one to accept
the claim that there is such a thing as "normal" or "undistorted" trade flows. In the face of distortion, wise
caretakers must intervene to correct the distortion so that the market can re-impose its autonomous order and
allow trade to pursue its "natural" undisturbed course. For a fascinating account of the reliance of trade law
and policy on the concept of "normalcy" against which "deviations" can be judged, see Daniel K. Tarullo,
Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of InternationalTrade, 100 HARV. L. REV. 546 (1987). For a critique
of the theory of markets functioning autonomously see also Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory
Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29 (1995).
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high environmental standards and high standards of living in rich states. In
other words, once they take account of the economic context, and in particular,
when they approach the issue of environmental protection from within a trade
liberalizing context, environmentalists are likely to be actively in favor of
standard harmonization-so long as it is upward harmonization. As between
no harmonization and upward harmonization, they will have a marked
preference for upward harmonization. It would therefore be inaccurate to
claim that high-standard environmentalists were not implicated in the adoption
of a strategy of standard harmonization in NAFTA and must therefore be held
blameless for any resulting inequities that such a system might impose on
lower-standard states. To the contrary, the choice of upward harmonization
was a direct result of the meshing of the environment and trade objectives in
a trade agreement. That upward harmonization constrains the autonomy of
lower-standard states, while giving added protection to the autonomy of highend states, is the direct outcome of the reconciliation of trade and the
environment. Furthermore, this reconcilation is likely to impose on low-end
states the costly burden of having to catch up to high-end states, giving a
consequent trading advantage to high-end states whose resources are not
equally diverted.
IV. CONCLUSION
High-standard state environmentalists could claim that the overall
objective should be to raise world-wide standards of environmental protection.
The means by which such a result is to be achieved is of only secondary
concern. Whatever works, works, and should not be dismissed out-of-hand
simply because it may not lead to perfectly equitable results. People in lowstandard states will in any case be better-off with high environmental
standards. To the extent that there is an economic development cost to higher
standards, either the long-term benefits of caring for human health and the
environment will compensate such states or foreign assistance may be
available to facilitate the transition.
While such arguments seem compelling on their face, they are also deeply
troubling. Ironically, it appears that high-standard environmentalists have
accepted one of the underlying premises of "sustainable development," which
suggests that there is an indissoluble relationship between economic
development and environmental protection. The attachment of high-standard
state environmentalists to upward harmonization as the trade/environment
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strategy of choice, results from their conviction that only an economically
strong and healthy state can afford to abide by a high-level environmental
commitment. In adopting upward harmonization, they are responding to the
fear that economic weakness (brought about by a loss of competiveness) would
lead to the weakening of environmental standards. They deliberately choose
an environmental strategy that will safeguard high domestic environmental
standards and will also protect the domestic economy. In this way, highstandard state environmentalists admit to the claimed cause-and-effect
correlation between a strong economy and high environmental standards and
a weak economy and low environmental standards. In so doing, they
recognize the link between environmental protection and economic
development which the concept of sustainable development was intended to
highlight.
While high-standard state environmentalists are also willing to admit to the
relationship between the economy and environmental protection in lowstandard states, they are only willing to take the economy of these states into
account to the extent that they do not interfere with their own high domestic
standards. From within a trade context, these environmentalists are unable to
address or even consider central elements of sustainable development. The
concept of sustainable development speaks to equity concerns, not just as
between generations, but within this and every other generation. Poverty must
be eradicated in order to achieve sustainable development. Sustainable
development is, of course, a compromise from an environmental perspective.
Nevertheless, it seems that if environmentalists are willing to consider
economic concerns in high-end countries, they should be willing to consider
them in low-end countries as well. It remains to be seen whether highstandard environmentalists can ever admit that a standard lower than their own
may be legitimate and appropriate, taking into account the different contexts,
even though this lower standard will be reflected in a lower product cost.
I would suggest that the dual gestures of protecting state autonomy in
NAFTA in order to protect the domestic environment, while constraining the
choices of other states in order to protect the environment abroad and the
economy at home, are the inevitable result of the reconciliation of trade and
environmental concerns at this juncture. Such problematic solutions must be
viewed from within a national context of distrust of globalization, with its
consequent loss of borders, loss of control, and identity. The strong urge to
protect the state's national identity, as expressed in the relationship between
local values and local standards, is set against the fear of the deterritorialized
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multinational corporation's predatory practices. Predatory in that we imagine
the creature will move easily and without regret, always in search of everbetter oppotunities for profit. The choice of upward harmonization is intended
to eliminate a basis for the possible departure of this borderless creature from
the nation's soil. It is a means to keep it anchored; to keep it in the nation
even though it is not of the nation. The fear of the borderless multinational is
thus the fear of not being in control. In a parallel turn, harmonization is not
threatening to the self, so long as the harmonization takes the form of
harmonization in the self's image.

